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After having been ignored for a long time by economists, happiness is becoming an object of 
serious research in 21st century economics. In Section 2 we sketch the present status of 
happiness economics. In Section 3 we consider the practical applicability of happiness 
economics, retaining the assumption of ordinal individual utilities. In Section 4 we introduce 
a cardinal utility concept, which seems to us the natural consequence of the happiness 
economics methodology. In Section 5 we sketch how this approach can lead to a normative 
approach to policy problems that is admissible from a positivist point of view. Section 6 
concludes. 
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During the last years we see a small revolution in economic science. I have in 
mind the rise of 'happiness economics ' as a serious branch of economics. Until 
quite recently the concept of 'happiness' as a research subject for economists 
was anathema. The aim of this paper is a consideration of  the relevance of this 
new development in economic science for economic science as such and for 
economics as a tool for policy making. 
The fundamental aversion among twentieth-century economists towards the 
concepts of happiness, well-being
1, etc., may be traced back to the influence of 
Behaviourism in general and the influential tract of Robbins (1932) in particular
2.  
Although Robbins recognized that psychology plays a role in the explanation of 
economic behaviour, he excludes the idea that feelings, and especially feelings 
of happiness, could be measured in an operational way. As we assume that 
economic behaviour, that is making choices between alternatives, is motivated 
by maximization of utility, satisfaction, well-being or happiness
1, this stand leaves 
the economist in an awkward position. He observes only the results of a choice 
process, but he does not observe the underlying components of the choice 
process. In terms of the traditional consumer model, he observes only the 
preferred commodity bundle, but not the indifference curves behind it. Happiness 
economics makes an attempt to observe and estimate the indifference curves on 
a space of alternatives. Such a space may involve various combinations of 
income, family size, health, etc. The same method could theoretically be applied 
                                                 
1 We will make no difference between those notions. The reason therefore is that all those notions are 
metaphysical concepts. Without an operational measurement method they remain empirically 
indistinguishable. 
2 I will refer to the second printing.   4
to assess the shape of indifference curves on the traditional commodity space. 
As far as we are aware of, this has not been done yet.  
Since at least from Pareto (1904) economists differentiate between ordinal utility 
and cardinal utility. Mainstream economists mostly do not talk of happiness but of 
utility. As we said before, the choice of the word is just a matter of taste without 
consequences. We may also talk of ordinal and cardinal happiness. Ordinal 
utility/happiness is just a labeling system for indifference curves, where a higher 
label corresponds to a higher utility level. If three indifference curves in a space 
of alternatives are labeled 1,2,3 respectively, it implies that the individual is 
indifferent between alternatives with the same label, that is on the same 
indifference curve, while 1-alternatives are considered as worse than 2-
alternatives and 3-alternatives as better than 2-alternatives. The curves may be 
relabeled as 2,  1
2 2  and 5 without any consequences. In the case of a cardinal 
utility/happiness  interpretation the re-labeling has consequences. In the first 
labeling system the utility differences between the three curves were equal, while 
in the second labeling system the utility difference between the first two is slight, 
while the difference with the third is considerable. Let us assume a population of 
three persons ,one on each curve. In the first system average utility/happiness 
would be 2 and in the second labeling system  1
6 3 .It is obvious that for a 
meaningful evaluation of average or national happiness or for the inequality in 
the happiness distribution the additional assumption of cardinality is essential. 
 
In the early economic literature there was a definite cardinal flavour (e.g. 
Marshall, Pigou). Economics as part of the social sciences was assumed to play 
a role in the solution of social problems, e.g. the alleviation of poverty and 
inequality, the promotion of employment and economic growth. Just taxation 
implied a comparison between individuals of losses in happiness caused by the 
imposition of taxes. Even if classical economists were unable to assess 
happiness and differences in cardinal happiness empirically, there was some 
perspective that in the future this might become possible. Since Robbins' (1932) 
influential tract the assumption of cardinal utility fell gradually into discredit. It got   5
the seemingly final blow by Samuelson (1947) and Houthakker (1950,1961) with 
their 'revealed preferences' approach and the ensuing erosion of the utility 
concept. 
 
Actually, this development of economic science over the last sixty years is a 
mixed blessing. By the erosion of the utility concept and the denial of a cardinal 
character to the utility concept economic science lost much of its relevance for 
practical socio-economic policy, which deals for a large part with distribution 
problems requiring comparisons of utility or happiness between individuals.   
Prudent economists do not dare to call one distribution not worse  than an 
alternative distribution, except if that distribution is not worse than the alternative 
for all individuals involved. For example, no one will have qualms when stating 
that an income distribution between two persons 
(1) (3000,2000) y =  is better than 
(2) (2000,1000) y = . The first situation is better in the sense of Pareto-optimality. 
However, at the same time this is a rather trivial statement. In most cases where 
distributions or social situations have to be compared we do not meet this 
simplistic situation. It is only possible to say that some people are better off in 
one situation than in the other and that the inverse statement holds for other 
people involved. Hence, we cannot make a statement about the ranking of the 
two situations in terms of social desirability.  
If economists are declaring themselves unable to make normative evaluations 
and comparisons, at the same time they declare themselves unable to offer help 
for most political decision situations, which as a matter of fact are and can only 
be based on such comparisons.  
It seems that theoretical mainstream economics has chosen for the more 
prudent, let us say, scientific position, sticking to Pareto-optimality as the ultimate 
tool, in this way reducing (perhaps rightly) the ambition of economics to be a 
policy instrument. 
However, it is not exaggerated to notice here a certain schizophrenia, hidden in 
many economists. On the one hand in theoretical work they detest to make 
normative statements, while in their applied    work they do it as a matter of   6
routine.  But even in many 'pure' fields of economics we find hidden normative 
judgments. For instance, the literature on the construction of income inequality 
measures on an axiomatic basis is full of hidden normative statements. For 
instance, the Dalton axiom that says that income inequality is reduced by 
transferring money from a rich person to a poor one is based on a normative 
vision (however sympathetic) on interpersonal utility comparison and the validity 
of Gossen's First Law, never scientifically shown to be true. 
The question we would like to tackle here is whether the new 'happiness 
economics approach' offers new perspectives for economics as a science and for 
its application in economic and social policy. Our reaction will be in the 
affirmative. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we sketch the present 
status of happiness economics and we link it with the earlier approach in the 
seventies of the last century known as the Leyden School. In Section 3 we 
consider the practical applicability of happiness economics, retaining the 
assumption of ordinal individual utilities. In Section 4 we introduce a cardinal 
utility concept, which seems to us the natural consequence of the happiness 
economics methodology. In Section 5 we sketch how this approach can lead to a 
normative approach to policy problems that is admissible from a positivist point of 
view. In Section 6 we draw some conclusions.   7
 
2. What is happiness economics? 
 
 Let us start to consider what happiness economics is. The underlying principle is 
simple and intuitively plausible. If you like to know how happy an individual is with 
'something', a straightforward method to get an idea about it is to ask an 
individual about his happiness with that 'something'. As happiness is a rather 
emotionally laden word, in practice we ask how 'satisfied' an individual is.  
The point of departure are so-called 'satisfaction questions' like  
 
How satisfied are you with your income? 
How satisfied are you with your job? 
How satisfied are you with your health? 
How satisfied are you with your life as a whole? 
 
Those questions have been posed in psychological surveys for quite some time. 
The discrete response is either in terms of verbal categories like 'horrible', 
'bad',….,'not bad', 'delighted' or in numerical categories like 1,2,…,5 or 
0,1,2,…,10. 
It is now generally accepted that such questions make sense. More precisely, 
most respondents are willing and able to answer such questions, and 
respondents in similar circumstances give similar responses. As shown above, 
such questions may refer to many different things, like in this example 'income', 
,'job', 'health' or 'life- as a whole'. It may be aspects of life, or as psychologists 
say 'life domains'. 
Up to this moment the response is nearly always discrete, although conceptually  
a continuous response scale is possible as well. In the latter case we may think 
of a continuous line interval from A (worst) to B(best) , where respondents put a 
cross at the point that corresponds with their feeling on a (worst,best) –scale. 
Modern satisfaction researchers or ‘happiness economists’ are not only 
interested in observing the degree of satisfaction with different 'domains of life'   8
and in being able to state that in the EU average satisfaction with income is a 7 
on a 10-scale and in Russia a 5. They are interested in the question why one 
person is satisfied to such –and-such a degree with a specific life aspect or life 
'domain'. Their primordial research question may be summarized as: What are 
the determinants of satisfaction?  
The basic methodology to assess the influence of different factors x is to assume 
a latent utility variable u for which holds  (; ,) uf x β ε = , where β is a parameter 
vector and ε a random disturbance term. It is assumed that all respondents that 
give the same response enjoy the same utility/happiness value u. That is, they 
are situated on the same indifference curve in an ordinal context. The most 
simple model is then to use a linear description and to assume for respondent n 
that  11 , 22 , 0 .... nnn n ux x β ββ ε =++ + + . Such a model with discrete response is 
traditionally estimated by Ordered Probit or Ordered Logit. The equation 
11 22 0 .... xx constant β ββ ++ + =  describes an indifference surface and the ratios 
/ ij β β  are the trade-off coefficients between the factors  i x and    j x . It is mostly 
possible to assess the shadow price of a variable x.  Let us assume  2 x  stands for 
income and  1 x is changed into  11 x x +∆ . If that increase is happiness increasing 
and if more income is also preferred to less income, then the change 
into 11 x x +∆ has to be compensated by an income decrease  2 x ∆ such that the 
individual stays on the same indifference curve. More exactly, we require 








The beginning of happiness economics is frequently set in the beginning of the 
nineties (see Frey and Stutzer (2002)). That is not entirely true. The work of the 
so-called Leyden School (L.S.) in the seventies of the previous century, named 
after the Dutch university to which  the research group was affiliated, can be 
seen as part of happiness economics as well, although in the beginning of the 
seventies the word 'happiness' was avoided by the Leyden School in favor of the 
less presumptuous term 'individual welfare of income'. It is interesting to line out  
what are the differences and similarities between the LS- approach and the   9
contemporary happiness approach (CHS). This is not only interesting from a 
scientific historical perspective. It might be that LS has things to offer that fill in a 
lacuna in contemporary happiness economics. Moreover, there seems to be 
some confusion among modern happiness economists about the question in how 
far the old Leyden School was on the same track. Therefore, we shall firstly 
devote some lines on the LS-approach.  
In 1968 I published my book on Individual Welfare functions and Consumer 
Behavior.  One of its main theses was that utility or welfare might be an 
operational and measurable concept. In Van Praag (1971), challenged by some 
empirical opportunities, I formulated the so-called Income Evaluation Question 
(IEQ). It was a question module by which something should be measured, that I 
called welfare derived from income. The idea was that only by questioning the 
individual himself we might be able to get information about his feelings on 
welfare (happiness,etc.). This idea of asking people about their feelings and 
accepting this as valuable information is a basic and common point of departure 
for LS and CHS. In 1971 most economists did not accept this simple truth, 
denying themselves by this refusal very valuable information. 
The Income Evaluation Question   (IEQ), has been posed in the years since then 
to many thousands of respondents. It runs as follows:  
 
The Income Evaluation Question (IEQ) (mid - interval version). 
Whether you feel an income is good or not so good depends on your personal life 
circumstances and expectations. 
In your case you would call your net household income:  
 
a very low income if it would equal € __________  
a low income if it would equal € __________  
a still insufficient income if it would equal €__________  
a just sufficient income if it would equal €__________  
a good income if it would equal € __________  




The differences between this IEQ and modern satisfaction questions can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. The IEQ deals with income, that is with financial satisfaction only. 
Satisfaction questions may deal with financial satisfaction, job satisfaction, 
life as a whole, etc. Hence, we have to compare the IEQ with the financial 
satisfaction (FINSAT) -.question. 
2.  The FINSAT-question asks for an evaluation of current income  c y . This is 
so to say the stimulus to the respondent. The respondent's reaction is an 
evaluation on a numerical or verbal evaluation scale. The IEQ provides six 
stimuli  16 ,..., UU in terms of evaluations on a verbal evaluation scale. The 
six reactions of the respondent are denoted by  16 ,..., cc . There are two 
possibilities to utilize the results provided by the IEQ: an ordinal and a 
cardinal one. 
3. In the ordinal representation we compare answers  , in c by different 
respondents  n  with different individual characteristics  n x . As the 
respondents with different characteristics are observed to need different 
income levels  , in c to reach the same FINSAT-level i, we may look for a 
relationship  11 , 22 , .... in n i n n cxx β ββ ε =++ + + . For fixed i  it describes an 
indifference curve for the level i. (see e.g. Van Praag and Van der Sar 
(1988) 
4. In the cardinal interpretation the Leyden School translated the verbal 
evaluations  16 ,..., UU into numbers 
3 11 1
12 12 12 , ,..., . That this is a reasonable 
way of translating words into numbers in this context, is empirically 
confirmed in Van Praag(1991). Then a lognormal distribution function 
() (; , ) nn n Uc c µ σ =Λ was fitted through the points 
6 21




= . The individual   11
parameters  , nn µ σ  are estimated
3 by the log-mean and the log-standard-
deviation of the responses  16 ,..., nn cc . It follows that by means of the IEQ an 
individual utility function (or in the LS-terminology an individual welfare 
function)  () n Uc  can be estimated for each separate individual. As  , nn µ σ  
differ over individuals those utility functions are different. 
5. The  individual  parameter  n µ  (like the separate answers  16 ,..., nn cc ) can be 
well explained by individual characteristics xn , including current income 
c y . As the coefficient of income is significantly positive, it implies that 
someone's utility function shifts with increasing income. More precisely, 
financial needs increase with a rise of current income. This shift of norms 
with respect to income with the individual situation was called in van Praag 
(1971) preference drift. It is  the same adaptation phenomenon that the 
psychologists Brickman and Campbell(1971) discovered in the same year 
in another context and empirical setting. They called the hedonic treadmill. 
The own situation serves as an anchor point; if the own situation changes 
norms about satisfaction will shift accordingly. 
6. As it is empirically found that  () (; ( ) , ) ) nn c n Uc c y µ σ = Λ , it is easy and 
attractive to estimate how individual n evaluates his current income. There 
holds  ( ) ( ; ( , ), )) ( ; )
def
nc cncn n cn U yy y xU y x µσ =Λ = % . The last term is the true 
evaluation by an individual of his own income. Hence, already in the 
Leyden School (see Van Praag(1971)) there was made a distinction 
between an ex ante welfare function, which describes how a specific 
individual evaluates all income levels and an ex post welfare function, 
which describes how all members of the population evaluate their own 
income. Here there is some analogy with the distinction between decision 
utility and experienced utility, made by Kahneman, Wakker, Sarin (1997).  
7. The link between LS-results and MHS-results lies in the fact that the 
Leyden  ex post welfare function is identical to the financial satisfaction 
                                                 
3 In the early LS-publications a slightly different method was used to estimate µ and σ; later on the log-
mean and log-s.d. appeared to give almost identical results.   12
function, that is, it has the same indifference curves. It implies that for 
financial satisfaction the same trade-offs are found as when using the 
financial satisfaction question. Then it is no wonder that many of the LS-
results can be found back in the MHS-literature, e.g. for the effect of 
reference groups, external effects, family size, etc. We refer to Van Praag 
and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) for an extensive review. Earlier reviews may 
be found in Van Praag(1976, 1993,1999). 
8.  Although in most of the Leyden literature the parameter µ is derived in a 
cardinal context, the parameter itself makes also sense in an ordinal 
context. Most Leyden results do not need that cardinal interpretation and 
keep their validity in an ordinal environment (cf. Van Praag,Van der Sar 
(1988). The cardinality assumption is only essential for the analysis of 
inequality and redistribution problems. 
9. In sum, the LS-literature is based on a somewhat more demanding 
question module. It deals only with financial satisfaction, while CHS deals 
with various domains and global welfare/happiness. In the domain of 
financial satisfaction it gives the same results as CHS, while the very 
useful distinction between ex ante and ex post evaluations is added.  
 
Although the Leyden School provided remarkable results and got some 
sympathisers all over the world, the truth is that it was never accepted by 
mainstream economics, because mainstream economics in the seventies 
maintained that such measurements were impossible in the first place. 
Sociologists and psychologists mostly did not know of the results, because those 
results were not submitted to their journals and in those days there reigned a 
terrible provincialism between the behavioral sciences, where sociologists and 
psychologists strictly rejected the idea that economists could have to offer 
something meaningful on the subject of 'feelings'.  
Somewhat later, also independently, Easterlin (1974) as a rare exception in 
those times studied happiness and discovered the famous Easterlin paradox, 
saying that differences in individual happiness between citizens within a country   13
may be explained for a good deal by differences in  material circumstances, while 
he found average reported happiness to be about the same in some strongly 
different countries, poor and rich all over the world.  
   14
 
 
3. The practical applicability of happiness economics, retaining the 
assumption of ordinal individual utility. 
 
In the previous pages we noticed already that satisfaction responses may be 
(partly) explained by objective factors x. Now we shall pursue this line.   The 
resulting outcomes of the satisfaction questions in surveys may be summarized 
by satisfaction distributions, as shown in Table 1, which we derived from the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). For instance, 10.93% evaluate their 




Table 1. Satisfaction distributions, Workers West Germany, 1996 (in percentages) 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Job  Sat.  0.80 0.55 1.73 3.04 4.32 10.93 9.96 17.97 27.89 13.  9.0
Financ.  0.31 0.33 0.77 1.89 3.46 9.35  10.62 22.19 30.10  13.46  7.53 
Health  0.68 0.54 2.03 3.59 4.51  12.13 10.11 17.49 26.06  13.25  9.62 
Housing  0.93 0.50 1.51 2.49 3.50 7.89 7.68  14.85 25.72  17.87  17.06
Leisure  1.02 1.33 3.57 5.49 6.32  13.68 11.51 16.86 21.40  10.01  8.81 
Envir.  Sat. 0.81 0.71 1.78 4.73 6.64  16.95 14.56 22.15 20.29  7.68 3.69 




If such job evaluations are meaningful responses, we have to assume that the 
18% respondents who evaluate their job situation by a 7 have about the same 
feeling of satisfaction with respect to their job. It cannot be that a '7' means for 
one respondent 'very good' and for another 'very bad'. This is a not unreasonable 
assumption for respondents who have about the same cultural and linguistic 
background. However, let us realize that this assumption cannot be proven to be 
true, for therefore we would need some kind of psychometer, which tells us by   15
psychophysical means how satisfied one is. Hence, the 'common background'-
assumption is a primitive assumption. However, it is an assumption, which is 
tacitly accepted in nearly all empirical surveys. This assumption is also called the 
assumption of interpersonal comparability of satisfaction. Clearly, this 
assumption is not strange at all except for the most extreme economic 
curmudgeons
4. Most humans will be in no doubt when they see somebody 
laughing or smiling; they will interpret it as a person in a happy mood. 
Alternatively, when we see a weeping or frowning person we will interpret it as 
that the person is unhappy. We interpret such signs of moods similarly and we 
are also able to identify those feelings of the other in terms of own feelings. The 
same holds for the interpretation of wordings in a questionnaire. 
If we assume interpersonal ordinal comparability to be a valid assumption, our 
data set can be split up into categories 0,1,…,10 of respondents who belong to 
the same satisfaction class. For the time being we do not assign yet a cardinal 
significance to those satisfaction levels, that is, we do not assume that a 
respondent belonging to class 8 feels twice as happy as one belonging to class 
4. However, we observe that two respondents, who are in objectively different 
circumstances, may be equally happy, for they evaluate their situation by the 
same response. They are situated on the same indifference curve.  
 
Now we shall consider how such a data set may be used for policy making. We 
focus as an example on the effect of family size on financial satisfaction. Notice, 
however, that this is just intended as an example of a general method. Below, we 
will point to some other applications. Our example will deal with the satisfaction 
with income, or financial satisfaction FINSAT.This point is illustrated by Fig.1. Let 
us assume that we find from our (financial) satisfaction question that family
5 A 
with a monthly income y= €.2000 and no children (fs =0) is equally satisfied with 
its financial situation as family B with an income y= €.3000 and two children (fs = 
                                                 
4 The definition is according to the dictionary: An ill-tempered person full of resentment and stubborn 
notions. 
5 We do not dwell here on the difference between the satisfaction of an individual and that of a 
household/family.   16
2). Or in formula (2000,0)    (3000,2), where the sign '  ' has to be read as 
'equally satisfied'. This observation leads straight ahead to a political recipe for 
the construction of a family equivalence scale. 
Assume that the government looks for an answer to the question how much 
family allowance we should give to a family C with income y= €.2000 and two 
children (fs = 2), in order that it will be at the same satisfaction level  as family B. 
It stands to reason that the financial situation of family C is  evaluated  less  than 
that of the family A with €.2000, since family C has two additional children to 
support.  In order that A and C feel equally satisfied the family C should get an 
income increase of €1000 in order to arrive at the same curve as A. In fact, the 
first two families A and B are situated on the same 'satisfaction indifference'- 
curve, while family C is situated on an indifference curve corresponding to a 


























more satisfied   17
We see that an increase in family size fs has to be compensated by an increase 
in income y in order to keep the family at the same level of financial satisfaction 
as before the family size increase took place. This is what economists call the 
compensating income. If this compensation is not given, the family shifts to a 
lower satisfaction level, which corresponds in Fig.1 to a higher curve.  
The family compensation to generate equality is € 1000, If we compensate by 
less, say €500, then the family will be under-compensated.  Would we like to 
compensate by more, say €1500, the family would be over- compensated. 
The amount of €1000 is what Kapteyn and I (1976) called a welfare-neutral 
family compensation. What we do not know, if we stick to the ordinal 
interpretation, is: how serious is the welfare difference caused by the €500 
under-compensation? Is the emotional difference slight or even negligible, or is 
the under-compensation really painful?  
Obviously, the government does not have to follow the rule of welfare- neutrality 
in practice. It may be that policy makers willingly prefer to over-compensate low-
income families and to under-compensate high-income families for political 
reasons. Then the political instrument of the family assistance schedule is an 
instrument to change the distribution of income and indirectly that of happiness. 
But, the welfare neutral scheme is at least a benchmark for policy makers to find 
out in how far the enacted schedule satisfies welfare neutrality and to see which 
income classes are overcompensated or under-compensated. 
 
As we suggested already, the crux of the matter is whether those indifference 
curves are estimable. The answer is yes. We may derive such curves from the 
answers on satisfaction questions, where the basic assumption is that 
individuals, who state that they belong to the same satisfaction response 
category, by definition are situated at the same indifference curve. The technical 
methodology is at this place beyond the scope. Let it suffice to say that the 
methodology has now been facilitated so much, also by means of standard 
software now available, that any economist or other social scientist with a slight 
knowledge of statistics and computer programming can perform such   18
estimations. Actually, there are different variants of the method, e.g. Probit or 
Logit Regression. As Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2005) have shown, the 
many experiences thus far yield remarkably stable and robust results, which only 
marginally depend on the specific method applied. In Van Praag and Ferrer 
(2004, 2006) it has been shown that simple OLS-variants may be constructed 
that are as good as Probit or Logit, but computationally much easier and faster to 
implement than the traditional methods. A moment of thought explains much of 
this robustness. All these specifications amount to different specifications of the 
labelling system of the underlying indifference curves, but the indifference curves 
themselves are unchanged and it are these indifference curves which are 
estimated, either by Ordered Probit, Logit or what else. 
 
 
The family equivalence scale derived from data from the GSOEP is tabulated in 
Table 2. We see that a couple with one child would need 13% more of net 




Table 2. Family Equivalence Scales, derived from Financial Satisfaction questions. 
 
Household size  Correction factor 
1  81% 
2  100% 
3  113% 
4  123% 
5  132% 
6  140% 
7  146% 
8  152% 
 
(from; Van  Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell , Table 2.3)  19
 
 
The real significance of this method becomes clear when we compare it with the 
traditional methods to define a family equivalence scale (see Van Praag and 
Warnaar (1997)). The most traditional method in economic literature is to assess 
the cost of children by means of budget analysis or by means of normative 
budgets, defined by nutritional experts. The latter approach is clearly 
paternalistic, as it depends on the opinion of a commission of experts. The 
former approach derived from demand analysis is based on assumptions, which 
are more or less arbitrary. For instance, that it would be possible to distinguish 
specific commodities and services as ‘adult goods’. (Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1986)). Then two families of different size are assumed to be at the same 
welfare level if they have the same consumption of adult goods. There are two 
basic problems with this method. First, what are adult goods: alcoholics, 
cigarettes, a haircut? The second point is that a couple with a child may have a 
completely different consumption pattern as a couple without adults without being 
less or more satisfied. It is probable that most parents will drink less than couples 
without child, but would that imply a lower level of satisfaction? The basic 
problem however is that equivalence can only be defined if we know or can 
observe when individuals are equally satisfied. The only way in which we can find 
this out is by asking people how satisfied they are and by assuming that 
individuals who use the same expression in order to express their level of 
satisfaction are equally satisfied. The adult good approach or any other approach 
that is not based on this simple observation must be seen as arbitrary (see for a 
more detailed analysis Van Praag and Warnaar (1994)). 
 
It is obvious that the satisfaction approach is also less exact than it looks like and 
has many limitations we need to be aware of. First, satisfaction may vary on a 
continuous scale. If we observe it discretely in terms of a few response 
categories, a loss of accuracy is incurred. Moreover, satisfaction methods   20
assume a model as well, which may be more or less realistic. For instance, the 
equivalence scale tabulated in Table 2 has been based on a model equation  
 
ln( ) ln( ) i uf sy α βγ = ++  
 
where  i stands for a specific response category, that is, level of financial 
satisfaction. This is actually the equation describing the satisfaction indifference 
curve of level i. 
 
In the log-case an increase by  0 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) fs fs fs ∆ =− has to be compensated by 
an income increase 
 
00 [ln( ) ln( )] [ln( ) ln( )] yy f sf s
α
β
−= −  
 
This specification is the basis for Table 2. We see that the compensation 
depends on the initial family size  0 fs , where we have a ‘cheaper by the dozen’ –
effect (due to the lgogartihmic specification of family size), and on the initial 
income level  0 y , which implies that richer people get more compensation in 
absolute amounts than poorer people. 
Who says that this is the correct equation? 
One of the problems with this equation is that the resulting income- 
compensation schedule depends on the initial income level. It is a fixed 
percentage of income. Let us now consider the alternative equation where 
logarithms have been replaced by absolute values:  
 
.. i uf s y α βγ = ++  
 
 
For the linear case the income compensation is given by    21
 
00 [] yy f sf s
α
β
−= −  
 In this case there is no 'cheaper by the dozen'- effect; each additional child is 
compensated for by the same money amount.  
The model equation 
 
.ln( ) . i uf s y α βγ = ++  
 
would yield a compensation  
 
00 [ln( ) ln( )] yy f s f s
α
β
−= −  
 
Here poor and rich people would get the same compensation, but the  ‘cheaper 
by the dozen’ –effect is maintained. 
It follows that the choice of the model equation is rather crucial with respect to 
the resulting compensation schedule. 
A second point is whether the indifference curves are parallel or that they are 
specific for the level i of satisfaction reached. Or in formula, 
 
ln( ) ln( ) ii i i uf sy α βγ = ++  
 
In that case the compensation schedule changes with the level of satisfaction. 
This might entail that rich people with a high level of satisfaction might have a 





 than poor people. Indeed, there is evidence found for 
this case (see Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004)). 
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A third complication is caused by the question whether financial satisfaction is 
only depending on the variables family size  fs and net income  y or that there are 
other variables relevant as well, e.g. region, age, price level. 
Certainly there are omitted but relevant variables. On top of that there is a 
random disturbance term, standing for all unobservable variables like individual 
psychological traits. We can use panel data models to control for individual 
psychological traits that typically do not change across time, for example 
optimism and intelligence. Nevertheless, we cannot control for those traits that 
change across time. For example, individual's capacity to adapt by changing 
expectations. 
It follows that this satisfaction approach is also not without difficulties. However, 
these specification and choice of variables difficulties are shared by both the 
traditional and the subjective satisfaction approach. Eventually, it depends on 
subjective choices, made by the researcher and sometimes by politicians, who 
like to get politically feasible results. 
But there is an essential difference between the traditional methods and this 
subjective satisfaction approach. The traditional approach begins with a naïve 
artificial criterion to answer whether families are at the same satisfaction level or 
not. In the subjective approach this is not necessary, as satisfaction equality can 
be empirically observed. If two respondents are equally satisfied, they will 
evaluate their satisfaction with the same value, either numerically or verbally. 
This opens the way to find empirically which equation and combination of 
variables fits the data, i.e., the responses on satisfaction questions, best.   
It is evident that the same methodology may be used to assess the effects of 
other variables on FINSAT.  
Up to now we have exclusively considered the relation between financial 
satisfaction FINSAT and the size of the family. However, it is possible to apply 
the same methodology to the satisfaction with other domains of life, like job 
satisfaction, health satisfaction or satisfaction with life as a whole. 
At first researchers were interested in determinants such as income, 
unemployment (Clark and Oswald (1994), etc. Later on the focus expanded to   23
the effects of reference groups (Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005)), 
inflation (Boes, Lipp and Winkelmann(2005), and to policy oriented issues such 
as health economics (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag (2002)), environmental 
issues like airport noise(Van Praag and Baarsma(2005)).Then the range of topics 
widens more and more to include crime and terrorism (Frey , Luechinger and 
Stutzer (2004)). 
Clark, Oswald, and Warr (1996) looked at job satisfaction and how it varies with 
age. They found that job satisfaction is U-shaped in age.  Many other studies 
using other data sets seem to confirm this. Job satisfaction, as many domain 
satisfactions and life satisfaction, seems to reach a minimum around an 
individual middle age after which point satisfaction increases together with age. 
The only exception is health satisfaction, which shows a negative relationship 
with age for any age (see Ferrer and Van Praag (2004)). 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) looked at the effect of unemployment on life 
satisfaction.  
Frey and Stutzer (2000) looked at the impact of more or less democracy on life 
satisfaction, based on differences in regional government in the Swiss cantons. 
They found that individuals living in more democratic cantons were happier under 
ceteris paribus conditions.  
Ferrer and Van Praag (2002) give an example where the monetary counter- 
values of losses in health, caused by various chronic diseases, are assessed. 
Van Praag and Baarsma (2005) evaluate the damage by airplanes, caused by 
various noise levels on inhabitants in the neighbourhood of Amsterdam Airport.  
They found that airplane noise damage could be compensated by giving the 
inhabitant about 2% of income as a compensation subsidy. 
Senik (2004), Ferrer-i- Carbonell (2005) and Luttmer (2005) investigate the effect 
of the neighbours' income on individual satisfaction. The reference effect was  
investigated by the Leyden School as well with similar empirical outcomes. It was 
then called reference drift.  (see (Kapteyn (1977), Van Praag, Kapteyn, Van 
Herwaarden (1979),, Kapteyn, Van Herwaarden, (1980),)    24
To these examples we might add many others from the now flourishing 
happiness literature. This method has been applied in many papers.  
One striking paper is that by Clark and Oswald (2002). They calculate the impact 
of different life events upon human well-being. According to that paper ' getting 
married, for instance, is calculated to bring each year the same amount of 
happiness, on average, as having an extra £70 000 of income per annum. The 
psychological costs of losing a job greatly exceed those from the pure drop in 
income. Health is hugely important to happiness. Widowhood brings a degree of 
unhappiness that would take, on average, an extra £170 000 per annum to 
offset'.  
Actually, the production of new papers and new results is so large during the last 
years that it is simply impossible to do justice to all authors and their valuable 
contributions. One of the recent surveys (Clark, Frijters, Shields (2006)) states  
 
"Studying the causes and correlates of human happiness has become one of the hot 
topics in economics over the last decade, with both the size and depth of the literature 
increasing at an exponential rate (Kahenman and Krueger,2006). To illustrate, a search 
of ECONLIT for journal articles with either "Happiness", "Life Satisfaction" or "Well-being" 
in the title, identifies 465 published articles between 1960 and 2006. Of these 363 (78%) 
have been published since 1995, 285 (61%) have been published since 2000 and one-
third of the literature (37%, or 173 articles) has appeared in print in just the last three 
years. Focusing only on the period 2000-2006, this measure of economists' interest in the 
'economics' or 'science' of happiness places that interest at roughly half the level of 
interest in "Wages" and just below that in "Discrimination". However, happiness is quickly 
catching up: it is in its 'industrial revolution' stage…."  
Consequently, we refer to the surveys by Di Tella and MacCulloch, (2006), Clark, 
Frijters, Shields (2006), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Senik (2005), Layard (2005), 
Dolan( 2006), Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) for more information. 
 
 
Our conclusion is that this methodology offers a viable way to assess the 
monetary costs and the compensation amounts needed to neutralize specific 
effects of changes in satisfaction determinants plus other interesting insights   25
such as the extent of poverty, and the effect of relative income and economic 
growth. We notice in passing that most of the studies cited do not take into 
account the mechanisms of preference and reference drift/ Hedonic treadmill and 
comparison income. As both mechanisms combined nearly neutralize income 
changes, the long-term effects of monetary compensations become 
questionable. However, we observe that for most problems there do not exist any 
other viable methods. 
This makes the new methodology extremely attractive for the study of policy 
problems. 
Finally, there are domains for which income is not a significant determinant of 
satisfaction. An example is health satisfaction. ,where  the income coefficient β 
was found not to differ from zero. In such a case the trade –off ratios in terms of 
additional income cannot be calculated. More or less money has no influence on 
satisfaction. In such situations the model remains politically relevant, if 
compensation can be given in other determinants, i.e. less working hours, or 
more safety in the streets.    26
 
 
4. The step to cardinality. 
 
Up to this point we have stuck to the ordinality assumption. That is, we assume 
that an evaluation of an ‘8’ compared to a ‘7’ indicates that the individual 
evaluates the first situation as better than the second. However, we do not know 
how much better. As already said, economists have always been reluctant to 
make the step from ordinality to cardinality. This was caused by the strictly 
behaviouralist approach, where one looks only at revealed preference behaviour. 
That point of view admits only the following statement. If alternative A is chosen 
above alternative B, it implies that satisfaction, anticipated from A is more than 
that of B, but it does not yield information about the value of the difference. Is 
alternative A 'slightly preferred to' or 'enormously better' than B? (see also Van 
Praag, Frijters (1999)) . 
For policy making this is a really nasty situation. First, if we like to compare the 
average happiness of populations (see e.g. Easterlin (1974), Blanchflower and 
Oswald  (2004)) this is strictly impossible if we adhere to the ordinal point of view. 
Let us demonstrate this with the following simple example. Let us assume we 
have two individuals. One is stating his happiness is 6 and the other evaluates 
his happiness by 7. The average is 6.5. If we give only ordinal significance to 
these answers, we may, according to the definition of ordinality, apply any 
monotonic transformation to the happiness values. Let us take the simple 
transformation of adding 1 to all values, so that the average becomes 7.5. It 
shows that taking average happiness as an index of the happiness of a 
population (in this case just two persons) becomes meaningless. Or put 
otherwise, all papers and authors, to begin with the famous and important paper 
by Easterlin (1974), who present such averages, are implicitly embracing a  
cardinal interpretation, even if they do not mention this explicitly. I do not blame 
them for doing that. It just demonstrates how natural this interpretation is and 
how unnatural it is to stick to an ordinal interpretation only. It may strike some as   27
strange that happiness would be bounded from below and/or above, as response 
scales like '1,…,10' or 'very bad,….,excellent' seem to suggest. However, in 
reality we have never met a respondent who, when faced with the question to 
evaluate his happiness on a (0,10) –scale, would refuse to answer because his 
happiness level, being a '12' was not included in the scale presented. Each 
respondent accepts and understands a finite scale, where the lower bound 
stands for 'Complete Misery' and the upper bound for 'Perfect Bliss'.   
 Similarly, it is interesting to consider the inequality of the happiness distribution. 
Let us continue this simple two-person example. We define inequality simply by 
the standard deviation of happiness. In this case the standard deviation is 0.5. It 
is easily seen that it does not change if we add one unit to both evaluations. 
Therefore, let us apply another simple transformation to the happiness 
responses. Let us now square the happiness indicator yielding 36 and 49 as 
happiness values. The average is 42.5 and the standard deviation becomes 6.5. 
It is obvious: aggregates, averages and inequality measures make no sense if 
we do not assume cardinality to begin with.  
Also happiness data do not give much support for the analysis of redistribution 
problems, if we stick to the ordinal interpretation. Let us assume an ordinal utility 
function  (, ) Uyf s, which increases in income y. Two individuals A and B have 
utilities  (, ) A AA UU y f s = and  (, ) BB B UU y f s =  , respectively. Now one thing is sure, 
the ordinal interpretation ensures that we may redistribute the sum income such 
that both individuals get the same utility by solving the equation   
(, ) (, ) A AA BB B UU y y f s U y y f s U =− ∆=+ ∆=  under the provision that redistributed 
incomes are positive. The individuals A and B are then on the same indifference 
curve. However, apart from this utility equalization we cannot make any 
statement, if we do not admit for the cardinal interpretation. If we would 
redistribute by  y ∆ but fall short of equalization, we cannot say whether the utility 
loss of A  (, ) ( , ) A AA A Uy f s Uy yf s −− ∆ is greater or smaller than the utility gain 
(, ) ( , ) BB B B Uy yf s Uy f s +∆ −  of B. The net aggregate effect of any redistribution 
cannot be assessed.   28
The obvious solution is to accept the cardinal significance of subjective self-
evaluations of happiness or satisfaction as meaningful. Or more directly, if a 
respondent evaluates his happiness by a ‘6’ or an ‘8’, we have to accept that 
answer as his or her degree of happiness. It implies that we accept a transition 
from 6 to 7 or from 7 to 8 to stand for equal improvements of happiness. 
Is this such a strange assumption? In my eyes not. In the first place it is a 
question of semantics, and common culture. Language is a common good, 
created in an evolutionary way in order to have a means of communication 
between people. That is, words represent (roughly) the same meaning to all in 
the language community. We all believe that happiness is bounded from below 
by a state of absolute despair (not necessarily to be equalized with death) and 
from above by a state of perfect happiness or ‘bliss’. It follows that it is natural 
that evaluations will be on a bounded scale like school grades, e.g., from 0 to 10 
or their verbal equivalents ‘very bad’ to ‘excellent’, used in many schools as well. 
And in the same way the most efficient way to use the gradations in between, is 
to assume that each subsequent grade stands for an equal jump on the ladder 
between 0 and 10.  
What is the difference between this cardinal satisfaction concept and the 
shunned concept of cardinal utility in consumer theory? The difference is that 
from the observation of purchasing or more generally choice behaviour we 
cannot derive cardinal information (revealed preferences), while satisfaction 
questions provide that information, however inaccurately (stated preferences). 
There is no mystery about how it is done either. It is just a repeatable question 
module yielding a straightforward answer. 
This is just the same method as is used in physics for some centuries, when 
measurement units and methods are developed to measure electrical currents, 
light intensity, temperature and so on. It is evident that there is some 
arbitrariness involved in how to translate the phenomenon in terms of a specific 
scale, but after that choice has been made the measurement unit gets a life of its 
own. By its usage it gains significance and after some time the results get a 
common language meaning, just as the strength of an electric current is   29
described in Volts for the technician, or the dioptre for an individual wearing 
glasses. For instance Wikipedia defines : 
 
A  dioptre is a unit of measurement of the optical power of a lens or 
curved mirror, which is equal to the reciprocal of the focal length 
measured in metres (i.e. 1/metres). For example, a 3 dioptre lens brings 
parallel rays of light to focus at 1/3 metre. 
Quantifying a lens in terms of its optical power rather than its focal length 
is useful because when relatively thin lenses are placed close together 
their powers approximately add. Thus a thin 2 dioptre lens placed close to 
a thin 0.5 dioptre lens yields almost the same focal length as a 2.5 dioptre 
lens would have. … 
 
 
We see here exactly the same procedure: the unit of measurement is defined by 
some observation. The usefulness of this particular choice is then explained 
because the observation, so measured, is handsome to use in important 
calculations where an (approximately) additive law holds. 
Transferring the argument to the measurement of happiness we see that there is 
nothing arbitrary in the measurement of happiness by survey questions. It is a 
well-defined empirical operation. If we accept it, the way is open to defining 
averages, inequalities and evaluating redistributions, in short to the use of 
happiness or satisfaction calculus for normative social policy. The only thing we 
have to accept is that our measurements are less exact and more volatile over 
time than physical measurements. Hence, it is easier and more reliable to make 
statements on the average happiness of a population of individuals, where the 
measurement errors will compensate each other, than to make statements about 
a single individual.   30
 
 
5. A glance at the political usage of cardinal satisfaction. 
 
 
As shown before, if we accept the assumption of interpersonal ordinal 
comparability, there are a lot of relevant socio-economic applications in the field 
of equivalence scales. However, if we also accept the assumption of cardinality, 
there opens up a new world. Happiness of individuals is defined by a measurable 
and repeatable operation, where the measurement does not depend in any way 
on the observer. It is an objective measurement. That is, if the response 
categories are 1,2,3,…,10 it is assumed that all respondents  scale their 
happiness between 0 and 10 and that all respondents evaluate the adjacent 
jumps between categories as equal. Clearly, this assumption cannot be proven to 
be true in an empirical way. This could only be validated in an objective way, if 
we had an alternative way of measuring individual 'happiness'. However, 
'happiness ' as such is a metaphysical concept. It becomes a physical concept 
only by defining it by means of an empirical measurement method. The outcome 
of such measurements should not depend on the person who measures and it 
should yield (roughly) the same outcomes in repeated measurements. Last but 
not least the measurement outcomes should fit our predictions more or less. The 
first two requirements are obviously met. Whether the third requirement is met is 
a matter of taste. If most people feel it is met, it does.  
There is one point of confusion that is frequently raised. How is it possible that 
one individual evaluates a specific situation as 'extremely satisfactory', while 
another individual evaluates the same situation as 'extremely unsatisfactory'? Is 
this not tantamount to saying that the happiness- meter is extremely unreliable 
and unstable? The answer to this apparent paradox is that each individual 
evaluates situations in his own way, given his personal situation, his past 
experiences, his social environment, etc.. We would only have a problem if two 
very similar persons would evaluate the same situations differently. Fortunately,   31
this is not the case. It is also therefore, that a systematic explanation of 
satisfaction answers is possible, yielding statistically significant effects.  
 
 
If we assume that a cardinal interpretation is meaningful, we may think of new 
applications. 
The first result is that we can produce a social happiness atlas of a society. See 
the society as a landscape of persons. The co-ordinates are social 
characteristics like age, education, region of the country, civil status, income, 
political party, employment status, etc. For each point on the map we get an 
altitude co-ordinate, standing for 'happiness' or satisfaction with life. We may also 
think of several co-ordinates standing for several domain satisfactions. We refer 
to Van Praag, Frijters, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003), where it is shown that 
happiness with life as a whole may be seen as an aggregate of domain 
satisfactions. It follows that the policy maker gets an idea of how happiness is 
distributed over society, and how domain satisfactions are distributed as well. As 
he may estimate the impact of various policies on individual satisfactions, this 
gives also the key to formulating policies that may enhance the happiness of 
groups of individuals or of the society as a whole. As measures generally will 
favor some citizens and worsen the position of other citizens, it becomes also 
possible to get some idea of a Kaldor compensation in terms of increments and 
decrements of happiness. We refer especially to Kapteyn ,Van 
Herwaarden(1980), who studied the effect of changing tax schedules on the 
distribution of financial satisfaction, taking into account reference and adaptation 
effects. In short, this is a fascinating piece of information for any policy maker. 
Aggregation of individual happiness would also lead to an index for Gross 
National Happiness (see also Kahneman (2004)). In essence this is the 
Benthamite Social Welfare Function (SWF).  
Then the government's objective might be to maximize this social welfare 
function. However, there is a problem here: the weighting problem. Should 
everybody be weighted equally or should for example the poor be over-weighted   32
in the SWF? It is well –known that the SWF may be defined more generally by 
the use of weights as SWF= nn
n
wU ∑ or still more generally as SWF= 1 ( ,..., ) N WU U . 
Each individual or each social group gets its own weight. We see that knowledge 
of the individual happiness levels does not give automatically a happiness index 
for policy makers(See also Frey and Stutzer (2005)). Here is a political value 
judgment required about the functional specification of the SWF. Needless to say 
that political parties as a rule will embrace different SWF-specifications. 
 
However, there are several less ambitious objectives where the new apparatus 
can play a significant role.  
The first field is poverty analysis. If we define everybody as poor if his U α < , 
where α is a cutoff-point, either chosen by policy makers or by means of a survey 
by the population concerned, then we can estimate how many individuals or 
households are poor in society and, what is very important, we can identify the 
poor according to their social co-ordinates. The value of α may be taken to equal 
4 ("bad") on a 10 –scale or less severely 5. This is the so-called subjective 
poverty approach. We refer to the first contribution in this line by Goedhart et al. 
(1977) and for a multi-dimensional domain satisfaction approach to Van Praag 
and Ferrer (2007). Hence, we get a poverty map of society and this is helpful for 
policy, because policy measures can become better targeted. First with respect 
to social coordinates, that is, which specific groups need help and can be 
effectively supported? Second, because we can differentiate help with respect to 
life- domains. Some are 'health- poor', because their health satisfaction is low, 
and need more health care or health cost subsidy. Others are 'job-poor' and need 
better working conditions. Again, others are feeling financially poor and need 
more income support. 
 
The second field is the impact assessment of political measures on various social 
segments. If we know the determinants of satisfaction and happiness and the 
government changes the values of those determinants, then we are also able to   33
assess the impact of such changes in terms of individualized happiness gains 
and losses and changes in (subjective) poverty gaps. 
Up to now the reader may have got the idea that the measurement of happiness 
and satisfaction is only relevant for policy makers. However, this is by no means 
true. The third field deals with more commercial applications. We think on the 
cardinal measurement of self-rated satisfaction with health. Changes in health 
can be assessed in terms of ‘health gains’ and ‘health gains per 
dollar’(VanPraag,Ferrer(2004), Dolan and Kahneman (2006)). This is clearly not 
only relevant for the shaping of health policy, but also for pharmaceutical firms, 
health insurance companies, and all other kinds of health agents and authorities. 
In modern countries the value of therapies and medicines has to be assessed in 
order to get them in the insured package. Therefore a cost- benefit analysis is 
needed, that takes account of the costs and labour productivity effects. However, 
an important dimension of the benefits is the so-called intangible benefits. These 
are frequently neglected or estimated in a somewhat arbitrary way. For instance, 
by assigning a value of $100,000 to each healthy life year. How much better feels 
the patient and perhaps his family really? Here the subjective measurement is 
coming in the picture. This cost-benefit assessment (including the intangibles) 
may also be applied to subgroups of the population, differentiated according to 
age, health risk profiles, or specific diseases.   
Similarly, job satisfaction evaluations may be used as a tool for evaluating 
personnel policy. Another field of application might be establishing the money 
value of health injuries and the corresponding damage amounts to be paid. 
It lies at hand to apply the methodology in marketing analysis.  We may measure 
in the same way the satisfaction with a car, a house or peanut butter. This may 
give indications to marketers how to direct their selling efforts and/or to model the 
product materially or in image. Then it is only one step to define descriptions of 
real products and fictitious ones by means of vignettes to be evaluated by 
respondents in surveys or in a laboratory situation.  Notice that the latter 
evaluations are based on ex ante utility conceptions.   34
                                                           
 
 
   
6. Conclusion. 
 
At the moment we see in the circles of some economists still a certain reluctance 
to recognize the significance of the happiness economics methodology, and 
especially to admit for  a cardinal significance of satisfaction questions. This is no 
doubt the result of half a century of cursing cardinalism. It is our prediction that in 
the next decade the measuring of cardinal utility or satisfaction by means of 
satisfaction questions will become a matter of routine. Obviously, the extension 
to normative policy via the admission of cardinalist interpretations will not devalue 
the ordinal usage for compensation questions, etc. The admission of cardinalism 
is an extension of the methodology for new objectives, not a substitution of one 
method for another. 
This implies that the methodology of what is now called ‘happiness economics’ 
probably will become one of the major instruments of socio-economic policy. At 
the moment we stand just at the beginning.  
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